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Abstract
Before 1978, most of the U.S. domestic copper production and an important fraction
of the imports were traded at a price set by the major U.S. producers. Simultaneously,
the rest of the world was trading copper at prices determined in auction markets. This
two-price system ended in 1978, when the largest U.S. producers began using the Comex
price of reﬁned copper as a benchmark for setting their prices. Using this regime shift I test
empirically the competitive behavior of the US copper industry before 1978. The results
show that copper prices were close to the ones predicted by a competitive model of the
industry.
JEL: D40, D43, L13, L61, and L72.
Keywords: Copper Industry, Market Power.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In general, the transactions between buyers and sellers of reﬁn e dc o p p e ri nt h ew o r l d
are done using spot prices, which are determined in auction markets like the London Metal
Exchange (LME) or the New York Commodity Market (Comex). However, before 1978, the
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1domestic production and an important fraction of the imports1 of reﬁned copper in the U.S.
were traded at a price known as the U.S. producer price, which was set by the major U.S.
producers.
There is also some evidence suggesting there was price collusion among U.S. copper pro-
ducers during the existence of this two-price system. There are, for example, several periods
of time with a constant price of copper in the U.S. (1951-52 and 1962-63 the longest ones)
while the LME, a competitive free market, shows many ﬂuctuations. There were also some
long periods of time when the domestic prices were much higher than the international prices.
During the 1974-76 period, for example, the diﬀerence between the U.S. producer price and
the LME price was 9c //lb. on average, and the average charges for freight, insurance and stor-
age for copper sold in London were around 2-3c //lb. These facts and the behavior of the U.S.
copper producers were investigated by the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Government2, but no
conclusions regarding the existence and exercise of market power were reached and no actions
were taken.
The two-price system oﬃcially ended in may of 1978, when Kennecot, the largest U.S.
domestic producer, announced that it would start using Comex prices as a reference for its
contracts.
An important eﬀort in the literature has been devoted to explain why the U.S. copper
industry enjoyed monopoly power before 1978. Less work has been done trying to test if that
1During the period 1950-1978, imports represented, on average, 9% of U.S. reﬁned copper consumption and
around 93% of these imports came from U.S. subsidiaries.
2See the "Report of the Subcommittee on Copper to the Cabinet Committee on Copper", Washington, may
13, 1970; see also "Copper: Quarterly Industry Report", U.S. Department of Commerce, Business and Defense
Services Administration, Vol. 16, No. 2, January 1970.
2monopoly power was actually exercised or not and up to what extent.3 In this paper I test
empirically the competitive behavior of the US copper producers. Even though the copper
industry is highly concentrated and with important sunk costs, the results show that the U.S.
producer prices were, on average, very closed to the ones predicted by a competitive behavior
of the industry.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the U.S. copper industry
and discusses the two-price system. Section 3 explain the speciﬁcs of the copper industry and
presents the models of demand and supply of copper. Section 4 explains the data. Section 5
shows the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The U.S. Copper Producers
The production of reﬁned copper in the U.S. has always been concentrated in a few compa-
nies. During most of the post WWII period, the U.S. copper industry has had only three major
producers: Anaconda, Kennecott, and Phelps Dodge. These three companies are integrated
producers, who supply their smelters and reﬁneries with company-mined ores. There exist also
the so-called "custom smelters" companies, which reﬁne copper produced by non-aﬃliated
ﬁrms. There have been two major custom smelter ﬁrms during the period 1950-95: Amax and
Asarco. Hence, even when the custom smelter ﬁrms are considered as relevant actors in this
3The only study I am aware of is the one by Hartman, Bozdogan and Nadkarni (1979 ). They simulate three
pricing strategies: average variable cost pricing (P=AVC), full cost pricing (P=ATC), and collusive pricing
(MR=MC). Then, the results of the simulation are compared with actual prices to conclude that the full cost
pricing strategy is the strategy that best approximates actual prices.
3market, we are speaking of only ﬁve ﬁrms at most.4 Figures 1 and 2 show the smelting and
reﬁning capacity of the top three and top ﬁve companies respectively, compared to the total
industry for the period 1955-95. The percentages of the total industry capacity owned by the
three biggest ﬁrms are, on average for the whole period, 73.8% for smelting and 61.9% for
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4There is no periodical public information about production by ﬁrm that would allow me to quantify the
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2.1 The Two-Price System
Most of the transactions between producers and consumers of reﬁned copper are done
through one-year contracts that specify a monthly quantity with a price equal to the spot
price at the day of delivery.5 As it was mentioned before, the spot price used in these contracts
is the price determined in auction markets. However, before 1978, domestic and imported
reﬁned copper6 in the U.S. was traded at a price set by the major U.S. producers.
5A typical contract speciﬁes the total annual tonnage, the monthly delivery and the point of delivery. The
price is not speciﬁed, but stated as "the seller’s price at the time of delivery", where usually the LME or Comex
spot price is speciﬁed as the seller’s price.
6B e f o r et h em i d7 0 ’ st h em a j o rU . S .p r o d u c e r sa l s oo w n e dmost of the large mines in South-America, Africa
and Oceania. Therefore, a considerable proportion of imports were actually from U.S. subsidiaries in foreign
countries.
5Why did this two-price system exist and why did not arbitrage equalize the two prices?
The most common explanation found in the literature (Fisher, Cootner and Baily (1972),
Mackinnon and Olewiler(1980), Richard (1978),Vial (1988,1992)) for the existence of the two-
price system, is that U.S. producers set the price to reﬂect a sustainable and proﬁtable long-
run level of copper prices (taking into account their own resulting supply decisions). The idea
behind this argument, is that copper producers consider that a stable price will lead to a higher
present value of proﬁts than a volatile price that ﬂuctuates in response to short-run variations
in supply and demand. Considering it in their own interest then to have a stable price, they
take the price they set as given for the time being and decide the amount of copper they will
supply at that price. When the LME price is above the US price, producers do not increase
the price for two reasons:
-Customers who can use aluminum, the main copper substitute, can invest in aluminum-use
machinery and then they will not switch back to copper for a long time.7
-Higher prices might be a signal of higher long-run prices and then new producers will enter
(either new mines will enter or existing mines will expand capacity).
To explain consumers’ behavior, who take the U.S. price as given but also have the option
of buying imported copper at the LME, the argument is that it might be proﬁtable to buy
domestic copper even when the U.S. producer price is higher than the LME price, because
that will guarantee access to U.S. copper during future periods of disequilibrium (in case of
rationing, for example).
7Vial(1988) considers that the main reason to keep stable prices was "the need to build consumers’ loyalty
in the face of the threat of further loss of the market to aluminum, which had a lower and more stable price
than copper".
6Some alternative and complementary explanations have been provided by Lal (1992) and
Taylor(1978). Lal thinks that export quotas in the U.S.8 and other countries permitted the
separation of the U.S. from the world copper market. This segregation gave ﬁrms monopoly
power and the existence of no resale clauses in the contracts prevented arbitrage from occurring.
Taylor uses a model of vertically integrated ﬁrms, where production pla n sm u s tb em a d ep r i o r
to the knowledge of price, to show that price smoothing increase the expected proﬁts of the ﬁrms
overtime. This is due to a smoothing of production ﬂows and the increased price information
available to the ﬁrms. An additional incentive for smoothing price would exist if ﬁrms have a
preference for a stable proﬁt ﬂow overtime.
It is important to mention that some few authors acknowledge the existence of the two-
price system, but think that it had no eﬀect on the competitiveness of the U.S. reﬁned copper
market. Richard (op. cit.), for example, considers that "the U.S. copper producers form a
relatively weak oligopoly" and that "arbitrage between the U.S. price system and LME prices
keeps the two prices in line with one another". The main reason for this to occur is that the
U.S. secondary industry trades (mainly scrap) at LME prices and that assures the working of
the arbitrage.
Independently of the reasons why the two-price system existed and if the U.S. producer
price was a competitive one or not, it is a fact that the system ended during the late 70’s.
During early 70’s the four largest copper-exporting countries (Chile, Peru, Zaire (Republic of
Congo) and Zambia) nationalized their copper mines, which were owned mainly by American
8During the Vietnam war period quotas on exports of copper products were imposed. They started in
november, 1965, and were dropped in early 1970.
7multinational corporations. Chile, then, in 1976, decided to replace the U.S. producer price
by the LME price as a reference for its exports and it was followed by others.9 During these
years also, several oil companies (Exxon, Amoco, BP, and Royal Dutch Shell) started buying
mining companies.10 As a result, by mid 70’s U.S. copper multinationals had lost a large
fraction of their market share to large state-owned companies based in poor or developing
countries and to oil multinational companies. Furthermore, for the ﬁrst time, the U.S. was
a net copper importer.11 In 1978, the largest U.S. producers12 began using the Comex price
of reﬁned copper as a benchmark for setting their prices. Since Comex and LME prices are
closely linked by arbitrage, the two-tier price system came eﬀectively to its end.13
3 The Copper Market
3.1 Copper Demand Function
Copper is mainly an input to produce durable goods and, therefore, the demand for copper
is a derived demand. Immediate consumers of copper are mainly semi-fabricators (rod mills
9In 1977, Peru, Zaire and Zambia tried to increased copper prices by setting export quotas for the four largest
copper-exporting countries. The attempt failed when Chile refused to accept quotas because it was involved in
a process of expanding capacity.
10A c c o r d i n gt ot h eO ﬃce of Technology Assesment of the U.S. Congress (1988), in 1983, mines owned by oil
companies represented 10% of the total production from the world’s 50 largest mines.
11In 1978 the industry ﬁled a petition for imports relief with the ITC, which recommended to imposed a quota
on copper imports, but President Carter rejected it.
12In may 1978, Kennecot, the largest U.S. domestic producer, announced that it would start using Comex
prices as a reference for its contracts.
13Vial (op.cit.) also considers as an important explanation of the switch to Comex price the new situation
in the aluminum market. In the late seventies the price of aluminum become more volatile due to increasing
competition in the market, and due to the increase in the cost of converting bauxite into aluminum as a
consequence of higher energy prices. With a higher and less stable aluminum prices, the threat of consumers
switching to aluminum was dramatically reduced and, therefore, the need of stable copper prices to build
consumer loyalty disappeared.
8and brass mills) that use copper to produce intermediate goods that are then used as inputs
by the end users of copper14. The main industries using semi-fabricated copper goods as
inputs in the U.S. are, based on the Copper Development Association reports, electric and
electronic products (for telecommunications and wiring devices), building construction (for
plumbing, heating, air conditioning, and wiring) and industrial machinery and equipment.
The production of durable goods is highly energy intensive and the main copper substitute
in these industries is aluminum. Using this information the following copper demand can be
speciﬁed:
logCt = β0 + β1 logPct + β2 logPat + β3 logPet + β4t +
β5 logwt + β6 logIP (1)
where,
wt : wage
Pct: price of copper
Ct :q u a n t i t yo fc o p p e r
Pat : price of aluminum
Pet : price of energy
IPt: industrial production
14Wire mills produce bare wires, insulated wires and cables; and brass mills produce mainly shapes (sheets,
rods and tubes). The two main uses of copper in the US economy are building construction (40%) and electrical
products (20%).
9Equation (1) is the demand function to be estimated in the empirical part.
3.2 Copper Supply
The technology and processes required to produced reﬁned copper from copper ores found
under the ground is quite simple. The production of reﬁned copper involves four steps: mining,
concentration, smelting and reﬁning.
In the mining process, copper ores are extracted from the ground and crushed. During the
concentration process crushed ores are treated either in a leaching or a concentration plant,
where copper cements (precipitate) and concentrates are obtained respectively. Copper mines
and treatment plants are always vertically integrated. The reason for this is the transportation
cost; it is expensive to transport ores that contain less than 1% of copper on average15.
In the smelting stage, copper cements and concentrates are processed in a smelter, where
they are melted and oxidized in furnaces to remove impurities16.T h e ﬁnal output of the
smelting process is copper blister. Finally, in the reﬁning stage, copper blister casted in the form
of anodes is placed in tanks containing an electrolytic solution and sheets of electrolytic copper.
Then, direct current is applied to the solution and the copper is dissolved from the anodes and
deposited as reﬁned copper in the cathodes. The ﬁnal output is an electrolytic copper cathode
(reﬁned copper) with 99.9% purity, the ﬁnal product for industrial consumption.
It is important to mention than during the reﬁning stage some valuable by-products are
15It is expensive in the sense that you are paying to transport 99% of wasting material.
16If the leached solution is rich enough, copper oxides can be alternatively treated in a solvent extraction-
electrowinning (SX-EW) plant whose ﬁnal output is a copper cathode. With this process the smelting and
reﬁning stages are skipped, but some electrowon cathodes have less purity than electrolytic cathodes and they
need to pass trough the reﬁning stage anyway.
10recovered. Obviously, these by-products do not change the cost of producing reﬁned copper,
but they must be considered because they make production more proﬁtable. Usually the type
of by-products obtained depends on the geographic region of the mine, but, in general, the
most common copper by-products are gold, silver, nickel, zinc, molybdenum and cobalt17.
The estimation of the copper supply in the literature has usually been done under the as-
sumption of a partial adjustment model, which implies an increasing marginal cost function.18
However, simulations and estimations done with a constant marginal cost up to capacity have
performed much better when compared with actual cost data. Hartman, Bozdogan and Nad-
karni (1979), for example, use engineering estimates of the variable factor inputs to estimate the
pollution abatement compliance costs of the copper industry. Historical simulations for pro-
duction and extensive cost analysis validate the model. Foley and Clarke (1982) derive supply
schedules from site- and input-speciﬁc cost data from 47 copper operations in the U.S. and they
conclude that "unit operating costs are constant up to maximum capacity".19 Furthermore,
people within the industry consider that a constant marginal cost is what best approximates
their costs20. Hence, I will assume a production function with constant returns to scale, which
17Copper ores in South Africa and Philipines are rich in gold; in Chile and the U.S. they are rich in silver; in
Zaire and Zambia they are very rich in cobalt; and, in Canada they are rich in nickel and zinc.
18Except Vial (1988) who estimates a constant marginal cost function and to validate that speciﬁcation he
estimates a Cobb-Douglas production function allowing non-constant returns to scale. The empirical results
and hypothesis testing of the latter estimation do not reject the constant returns to scale property, implying a
constant marginal cost.
19The additional evidence they provide to support this conclusion is that "In the short-run, copper mines
and mills vary output by increasing the numbers of shifts worked per week, thus keeping marginal cost fairly
constant. Inventory control of concentrate is used to keep daily smelter production at a reasonably steady level.
When a serious oversupply or undersupply of concentrates exists in inventory, the mine or smelter is shut down
for a short period".
20This comment is based on discussions with operating and management personnel of Enami, Codelco and
NorDeutsche-Reﬁnery, and several visits to their smelters and reﬁneries.
11allows me to specify a log-linear constant marginal cost:
logMCt = α0 + α1 logwt + α2 logPst + α3 logPet + α4 logPft + α5t (2)
where:
w : wages
Ps: price of silver
Pe: price of electricity
Pf : price of fuel oil
t :t i m et r e n d
Under the assumption of joint-proﬁt maximization the problem of the U.S. producers is:
max
pt
πt = PctCt − TC(Ct,w t,Pe t,Pf t,e µt) (3)


















where η is the demand price-elasticity (β1from equation (1))and MCt is the marginal cost
of the copper industry. As usual, the left hand-side of equation (5) is the monopoly marginal
12revenue, which would be equal to just Pct in a perfectly competitive model. Equation (5)
then, describes the supply correspondence of a monopolist, which becomes a supply function
in the case of perfect competition (when η = −∞). If we want to also consider the broad range
of oligopoly models that lay between the two extremes of perfect competition and monopoly,








where θ is a parameter measuring market conduct. Now, using equations (2) and (1) and
taking logs, equation (6) becomes:







Deﬁning Dt as a dummy variable equal to one when the industry is under any cooperative
regime and equal to zero when is perfectly competitive, a change in regime allows to identify
θ,the parameter of interest. Using this new variable, equation (7) is modiﬁed to:
logPct = α0 + α1 logwt + α2 logPst + α3 logPet + α4 logPfot + α5t + α6Dt (8)
Under any cooperative regime market prices should be higher than under perfect competi-






As in Porter (1983), if the sequence {D1,...,D T} is known, equations (1) and (8) can be
consistently estimated using two-stage least squares.
134D a t a
The American Bureau of Metal Statistics publishes an annual yearbook that contains
monthly prices, consumption, imports and exports data for most of the non-ferrous miner-
als. Even though the data are available for the whole period 1945-2000, I used monthly data
only for the period 1950-1995. The main reason to start in 1950 and not in 1945 is that price
controls imposed during World War II were removed in 1949. The reason to stop in 1995 is
that the methodology used to calculate reﬁned copper consumption was changed after that
year and, therefore, the data are not comparable.21
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the data. The variable used to measure consump-
tion is deliveries of reﬁned copper to fabricators in the U.S. and it measures recoverable copper
content in tons of 2,000 pounds.22 The copper price is the U.S. producer price for electrolytic
copper in cents per pound. The price was not reported by producers between September 1967
and march 1968, and also on july 1971. Fuel Oil prices are the No. 2 fuel oil prices at New
York in cents per gallon, as reported in Platt’s Oil Price Handbook.. The price of electricity
is an index of industrial electricity for 2,000 kwh. The problem with this variable is that is
not available before 1958, which forces the estimation of the model using only data for the
period 1958-95. As an alternative, I also estimate the model replacing the fuel oil and elec-
tricity prices by a price index for fuels and electricity from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that
covers the whole period 1950-95. The variable I use for wages is the average hourly earnings
21I contacted the American Bureau of Metal Statistics to see if it was possible to construct a comparable
series for consumption after 1995, but they claim they cannot obtain the data from the fabricators to do it.
22Authors who have estimated copper demands for periods before 1973 have used the variable "net consump-
tion by fabricators", also published by the Bureau of Metal Statistics. This migth be a better measure of copper
consumption but it was discontinued in December of 1973.
14of production workers in primary metal industries. As a measure of activity or production
levels in the semi-fabricated copper goods industry I use the Index of Industrial Production in
Manufacturing.23 All data are not seasonally adjusted and prices are deﬂated by the Producer
Price Index for durable manufacturing (march 1999=100).
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Copper Consumption 140434.6 31582.1 57505 238152 552
Real Copper Price 102.38 22.55 57.78 164.04 544
Real Aluminum Price 73.11 11.67 41.45 105.49 552
Real Fuel Oil Price 45.44 19.95 26.53 107.89 552
Real Electricity Price 81.59 17.19 58.44 114.28 456
Real Fuel-Power 57.894 15.86 39.92 101.90 552
Real Primary Metals Wage 10.07 1.17 7.31 11.87 552
Real Silver Price 542.95 350.67 293.6 3854.45 552
Ind. of Industrial Production 64.53 26.06 21.91 119.33 552
Strike 1959 0.0217 0.1459 0 1 552
Strike 1967-68 0.0181 0.1334 0 1 552
Strike 1983 0.0108 0.1037 0 1 552
Korea 0.043 0.2041 0 1 552
Vietnam 0.1847 0.3884 0 1 552
Time 276.5 159.49 1 552 552
Ration 1 0.038 0.1914 0 1 552
Ration 2 0.136 0.3429 0 1 552
Additionally, a set of dummy variables was constructed for strikes and wars: Strike83 is
equal to one for the period july 1983 - November 1983; Strike6768 is equal to one for the period
july 1967- april1968; Strike5960 is equal to one for the period august 1959 - February 1960;
Korea is equal to one for the Korean war period (June 1950 - July 1953); and Vietnam is equal
to 1 for the Vietnam War period (August 1964-January 1973).
Finally, it might be relevant for the empirical strategy that there is some anecdotal evidence
23I also considered the Index of Industrial Production for Durable Goods and the Total Index of Industrial
Production, but the results were almost identical.
15showing that U.S. producers rationed U.S. consumers in 1954-1956 and 1964-1970.24 The
variable Ration1 is equal to one for the period october 1954 - June 1956 and, Ration2 is equal
to one for the period january 1964 - February 1970. The latter two periods were identiﬁed as
periods of rationing by McNicol (1975) and as periods of excess demand by Mackinnon and
Olewiler (op. cit.).25
5R e s u l t s
5.1 Demand
Table 2 shows the results of the two-stage least squares estimation of equation (1) using
Prais-Winsten two-step procedure with AR(1). One of the potential issues to be considered is
that if what the literature has reported is true about periods or rationing, then the demand
function cannot be estimated for those periods unless eﬃcient rationing was used. I deal with
this potential problem in three ways. First I estimated the demand function assuming that
eﬃcient rationing was used (models 1 and 2 in table 2). Second, I estimated the demand
function adding dummy variables and/or dummy variables interacted with copper prices for
the rationing periods. The coeﬃcients of these variables were never signiﬁcant and the rest
of the coeﬃcients remained almost unchanged. And third, I dropped from the sample the
observations for rationing periods (models 3 and 4 in table 2). The only diﬀerence between
24Most of the information regarding the rationing periods is anecdotal and the investigation of the Houthakker
Committee provided little evidence concerning the timing and duration of rationing. There is no mention at all
about which buyers were rationed, how allocations were determined and how resale was prevented.
25In the literature, the existence of rationing has been basicallly inferred comparing the diﬀerence between
the reﬁned copper price and the price of scrap with the conversion cost of scrap into reﬁned copper. However,
conversion costs are estimated with a regression using a sample that excludes the rationing periods.
16models 1 and 2 and between 3 and 4 is that in the ﬁrst-stage regression of models 2 and 4,
the prices of electricity and fuel oil were replaced by the fuel and power price index, allowing
the use of the observations for the period 1950-57.26 The coeﬃcient for the Vietnam dummy
variable was very close to zero and never signiﬁcant in any of the models, so I dropped it from
the ﬁnal speciﬁcation.
Table 2: Demand
Copper Consumption Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Copper Price -0.3952 -0.3454 -0.4290 -0.3886
(0.1405) (0.1531) (0.1333) (0.1495)
Aluminum Price 0.0369 0.0352 0.0419 0.0544
(0.0339) (0.0600) (0.0567) (0.0565)
Ind. Indust. Prod. 1.4779 1.3108 1.700 1.4389
(0.1552) (0.1162) (0.1306) (0.1022)
Fuel Oil Price -0.0738 -0.0933 -0.0928 -0.1162
(0.0309) (0.0318) (0.0307) (0.0304)
Quarter 1 0.0847 0.0689 0.0963 0.0860
(0.0208) (0.0186) (0.0197) (0.0180)
Quarter 2 0.0826 0.0782 0.0837 0.0798
(0.0223) (0.0210) (0.0205) (0.1851)
Quarter 3 -0.0552 -0.0617 -0.0500 -0.0522
(0.0224) (0.0199) (0.0222) (0.0191)
Time -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0040 -0.0033
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Korea 0.1609 0.1103
(0.0427) (0.0303)
Constant 8.9485 9.3163 8.6500 9.2484
(0.9831) (1.1725) (0.8194) (1.0280)
Adj. R2 0.9033 0.8868 0.9119 0.92
N 417 513 349 424
F 498.52 454.46 449.18 532.42
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
The copper price is lagged eleven periods to be consistent with the one-year contracts
between producers and consumers, reﬂecting then the average time that fabricators need to
26Recall that the price of electricity is available since 1958.
17adjust their production decisions when copper prices change.27 The use of lagged prices might
imply that there is no endogeneity of prices, but as stated by McKinnon et al. (op. cit.)
"U.S. producers know that copper demand depends on lagged prices and they will take future
developments on the demand side into account when setting producer prices". For this reason,
a n df o l l o w i n ga l m o s te v e r y b o d yi nt h el i t e r a t u r e , I preferred the use of instrumental variables.
As can be seen in the next section, I use the real wages of production workers in primary metal
industries and the real price of silver as instruments. The estimated copper price elasticities
are negative and signiﬁcant, ranging between −0.35 and −0.43.T a b l e3s h o w sas u m m a r yo f
the price elasticities estimated by other authors in the literature, using diﬀerent data frequency
and periods. As can be seen when comparing to table 2, the results are in the upper range of
what other researchers have found.
Table 3: Demand Elasticities
Author Data Frequency Period Elasticity
Bozdogan and Hartman (1979) annual 1950-73 -0.47
Charles River Associates (1970) annual 1950-67 -0.21
Fisher, Cootner and Baily (1972) annual 1950-66 -0.213
Labys (1989) annual 1971-85 -0.39
Mackinnon and Olewiler (1986) quarterly 1947-74 -0.42
McNicol (1975) annual 1949-66 -0.326
Taylor (1979) quarterly 1956-75 -0.2
Thurman (1988) monthly 1975-84 -0.27
Vial (1988) annual 1965-84 -0.188
Wagenhals (1984) annual 1950-80 -0.35
The main purpose of this paper is to estimate market power, and, one of the key parameters
for doing it, is the price elasticity. Hence, an estimated coeﬃcient that is inconsistent or biased
27This is an unanimous practice in the literature. Authors using annual data lag prices one year and authors
using quarterly data lag prices three quarters.
18would lead us to wrong conclusions about the market conduct of the industry. In this sense,
it is important and reassuring to see that the estimated elasticities are within the range of
what others have estimated. Still, there is another potential problem that must be addressed,
which is the stability of the coeﬃcient. I am estimating a demand function for a period of 45
years, and it is reasonable to think that the price elasticity might have changed. I explored
this possibility in two ways. First, I divided the sample in two periods, before and after 1978,
and estimated the four diﬀerent models for each sample. Then, I used a Chow test to test
f o rt h es t a b i l i t yo ft h ep r i c ee l a s t i c i t yi ne a c hm o d e l .I na l lc a s e st h et e s td o e sn o tr e j e c tt h e
hypothesis of stability of the coeﬃcients.28 Secondly, I estimated the four models including a
dummy variable interacted with the copper price. Initially, I set the dummy variable to be one
before June of 1978, and zero otherwise, but I also explored some other possibilities. In all
cases, to my own surprise, the coeﬃcient of the dummy variable interacted with copper prices
was close to zero and not signiﬁcant.29
Following what many authors have done in the literature, I used the aluminum price lagged
11 periods. The reason for this is to reﬂect the fact that fabricators cannot switch from copper
to aluminum instantly, they require to make some adjustment in the production process and
to invest in some new equipment, and to do this takes time (at least one year seems to be the
consensus in the empirical literature). The coeﬃcient of the aluminum price was positive as
expected for a substitute good, but not signiﬁcant. Several authors have reported a similar
result or even a negative coeﬃcient. The main explanation found in the literature, is that
28Vial (1989) also performed several Chow and Cusum tests, and the null hypothesis of stable coeﬃcients was
never rejected.
29I nM o d e l1 ,f o re x a m p l e ,t h ec o e ﬃcient was −0.001 with a standar error of 0.023.
19the aluminum is not an equilibrium price but, as stated by Fisher (op. cit.), "an unrealistic
quotation which is either widely discounted or produces severe rationing on other occasions".
The most common solution, at least when using annual data, has been to use aluminum prices
in Germany, a competitive market. There are no monthly data available of aluminum prices
in Germany, so I could not implement that solution and I decided to keep the variable in the
regression even if it was not signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcient of the Index of Industrial Production (IIP) was positive, as expected, sig-
niﬁcant, and it ranged between 1.5 and 1.7. Based on the main industries using copper in the
U.S., I also estimated the models using the IIP for Durable Goods and the Total IIP, but the
results were not very sensitive to the index chosen. I decided then to report the results using
the IIP for Manufacturing because the R2 was slightly higher.
The estimated coeﬃcient of the Fuel Oil price has the expected sign, ranges between −0.07
and −0.11,a n di ss i g n i ﬁcant. Even though the fabrication of durable goods is very intensive in
the use of energy, especially fuels, many researchers have failed to consider an energy variable
in the speciﬁcation of the copper demand. Vial (1989, 1991) is the only one I am aware of
who has included an energy variable, and he reports a range of elasticities between −0.06 and
−0.15, with a mean of −0.0906. These numbers are consistent with the fuel oil elasticities
estimated by the four models in table 2.
T h et i m et r e n di sn e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant. I did not have an expected sign for this variable,
but Vial (1991) shows that there is a decreasing trend in the long-run evolution of the intensity
of use of copper, which might be explained by the replacement of copper by ﬁber optic in the
electronic industry and plastic in the construction industry. The quarterly dummies were also
20signiﬁcant, showing a negative seasonal eﬀect during the third quarter. The dummy for the
Korean war was positive and signiﬁcant, showing a shift in the demand curve that reﬂects the
increase in demand due to the war.
Finally, it is important to mention that some authors have argued that the change in
inventories of fabricated copper products aﬀects copper consumption and, therefore, it should
be included in the estimation of a reﬁned copper demand. There is no public information on
total inventories of the fabricators, so, as a proxy, I used the change of total inventories of
durable goods in manufacturing industries. The coeﬃcient was never signiﬁcant and the other
coeﬃcients were unaﬀected.
5.2 Supply Correspondence
As it was mentioned in Section 3.2, equation (8) can be consistently estimated if the
sequence {D1,...,D T} is known. Since the identiﬁcation of θ comes from the shift in regime,
from cooperative to competitive, it is critical to use the correct sequence. There is a generalized
consensus in the literature, the specialized magazines and managers of copper companies I
talked to, that the U.S. copper industry is a very competitive one since 1980 at least. This
allows me to set the sequence {Djanuary1980,...,D december1995} equal to zero. On the other
hand, there is the same generalized consensus about the U.S. producers having some degree
of monopoly power before 1978, allowing me to set the sequence {Djanuary1950,...,D april1978}
equal to one. The problematic period is between May 1978 and December 1979. As I mentioned
in the introduction, in May of 1978, Kennecot, the largest U.S. domestic producer, announced
that it would start using Comex prices as a reference for its contracts. Anaconda, another big
21producer, followed suit in August, just three months later. Some other producers switched to
Comex in March of 1979 and the last ones did it in August of 1979. It is diﬃcult to asses the
degree of competition in the industry during this period, it is clearly a transition period and
diﬀerent hypotheses would imply diﬀerent values for the sequence {Dmay1978,...,D december1979}.
Therefore, instead of guessing the right values for the sequence, I decided to drop the period
of the sample. There are many alternative sequences that can be considered as opposed to
simply dropping these observations, but I could not ﬁnd any information that allows me to do
an educated and accurate guess for the values of the sequence during this transition period.30
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of equation (8). The coeﬃcient of real wages
is positive as expected, it ranges between 0.31 and 0.49 and it is statistically signiﬁcant in all
models.
The price of silver is negative and signiﬁcant, with an elasticity that ranges between -0.075
and -0.093. It is true that this elasticity seems to be quite low, but it is statistically diﬀerent
from zero and that shows the importance of considering the copper by-products in the supply of
copper. Authors describing the copper industry, its physical characteristics and its technology
have been aware of this (Budge (op. cit.), Mikesell (1979), Wangehals (op. cit.)), but the
empirical work has usually disregarded the role of copper by-products.
The coeﬃcients of Fuel Oil and Electricity prices were both positive and signiﬁcant; they
range between 0.04 and 0.043 for fuel oil and between 0.52 and 0.56 for electricity. The elasticity
of electricity is more than ten times higher, in absolute value, than the elasticity of fuel oil,
30I explored three alternatives: ﬁrst, I set the whole sequence equal to one; second, I set the whole sequence
equal to zero; and third, I set the ﬁrst half equal to one and the second half equal to zero. The results did not
change dramatically and the conclusions regarding θ were not aﬀected.
22which might reﬂect that the electricity used in the reﬁnery is a more important input than the
f u e lo i lu s e di nt h es m e l t e r . 31 When the index of energy prices is used instead of fuel oil and
electricity, the results do not change much. The estimated elasticity of the energy price is 0.35
and is also statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 4: Supply Correspondence
Copper Price Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Real Wage 0.3360 0.4534 0.3099 0.4930
(0.1544) (0.1536) (0.1572) (0.1551)
Price of Silver -0.0797 -0.0922 -0.0749 -0.0933
(0.0272) (0.0260) (0.0299) (0.0279)
Price of Fuel Oil 0.0399 0.0431
(0.0276) (0.0281)
Price of Electricity 0.5177 0.5651
(0.1372) (0.1502)
Price of Energy 0.3451 0.3586
(0.0865) (0.0914)
Strike80 0.0307 0.0219 0.0291 0.0286
(0.0411) (0.0401) (0.0446) (0.0428)
Strike6768 -0.0062 -0.0043
(0.0288) (0.0278)
Strike59 0.0070 0.0085 0.0070 0.0082
(0.0291) (0.0281) (0.0315) (0.2998)
Time 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0005)
D 0.2907 0.3172 0.2774 0.3124
(0.1185) (0.1102) (0.1147) (0.1114)
Constant 6.0376 5.4416 6.1639 5.6412
(0.8242) (0.6399) (0.9039) (0.6725)
θ 0.0996 0.0938 0.1039 0.1042
R2 0.8866 0.8532 0.9022 0.9099
N 429 525 361 436
F 246.62 226.25 263.69 351.65
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
The strike dummies were never signiﬁcant. This is not what I expected, but I think is not
31The total estimated energy requirements are around 9 million Btu per ton of copper cathod produced in the
smelting process (roughly 2/3 in fuel and 1/3 in electricity) and around 6 in the reﬁning stage (all in electricity).
23surprising because they represent very short-periods of time with respect to the whole sample.
The time trend is positive and not signiﬁcant. This variable should capture the technological
progress in the production of copper. A very small coeﬃcient like the one estimated, shows
how slow and gradual the technology of producing copper has evolved.32
The coeﬃcient of the D dummy was positive, signiﬁcant, and it ranges between 0.28 and
0.32.T h i sc o e ﬃcient is α6 in equation (8), which represents the diﬀerence in the intercept of
the supply relationship between the cooperative period (before 1978) and the non-cooperative





,t h ev a l u eo fθ implied
by the estimated coeﬃcients of α6 and β1ranges between 0.09 and 0.1.T h e s e e s t i m a t e s o f
θ are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, which represents a deviation from perfect competition
(θ =0 ), but such low values of the estimates are basically consistent with prices close to the
ones predicted by a competitive model of the industry. Although the result might be surprising,
given all the anecdotal evidence on the contrary, it is also important to recall that the value
of θ must be interpreted only as the average market conduct of the industry for the period.
Therefore, what the empirical results show is that during the period 1950-78 copper prices, on
average, were quite close to competitive prices.
It could be argued that the results are also consistent with a symmetric Cournot behavior
in the case of ten ﬁrms (θ =0 .1). However, as it was mentioned at the beginning, during
most of the period there were only three major producers and if the "custom smelters" are
32There is not much information available about the technological changes in the copper industry or the
research and development eﬀorts. In 1986, R&D spending of the U.S. copper industry was less than 1% of
total sales and the national industrial average was 3.5% (U.S. Congress (op. cit.)). The same report states that
"there have been no truly radical technological advances in mining technology for at least several decades".
24also included, there were only ﬁve major ﬁrms in the market (which would imply θ =0 .33 and
θ =0 .2 respectively).
It is possible that some ﬁrms decided to switch to LME prices because the market was
already competitive. In that case the zeros in the sequence {D1,...,D T} should start quite
before may of 1978, the exact month when the switch in regime occurred. I explored this
possibility assuming that the industry had became competitive either one or two years before
may of 1978. For this purpose I estimated equations (1) and (8) again using two diﬀerent
assumptions for the sequence {D1,...,D T}. First, I set the sequence equal to zero after may of
1977 and, second, I set it equal to zero after may of 1976. The results were very similar and
the hypotheses that either α6 or β1 are equal to the previous estimates are not rejected.
It is also relevant to mention that the coeﬃcient for α6 is estimated quite precisely, the
conﬁdence intervals are between (0.052,0.502) and (0.101,0.533). If the lower value of the
lower bounds (0.052) and the higher value of the upper bounds (0.533) of these intervals are
considered as actual estimates of α6, then the estimated θ would range between 0.022 and
0.142. This range still represents low market power and even the highest value (0.14) is less
than symmetric Cournot with ﬁve ﬁr m s . I ft h es a m ee x e r c i s ei sd o n eu s i n gt h el o w e ra n d
higher values of the lower and upper bounds of the conﬁdence intervals of both α6 and β1 for
each model, then the estimated θ would range between 0.0023 and 0.281. Hence, only in the
extreme case in which the actual estimates of α6 and β1 were both equal to the upper bound of
their respective conﬁdence intervals, the average market power would be close to a symmetric
Cournot behavior.
The estimation of θ relies on the use of the correct functional forms of the supply and
25demand function and, therefore, it is important to consider how sensitive the results are to
ad i ﬀerent speciﬁcation. For this purpose I estimated equations (1) and (8) using a linear
speciﬁcation. The estimated demand elasticities were lower than the ones estimated using a
log-linear speciﬁcation, ranging now between −0.1164 and −0.2371.T h ee s t i m a t e dθ ranged
between 0.0022 and 0.0091, and it was not signiﬁcant in two cases and signiﬁcant at 10% in the
other two.33 The conclusions from these results are not dramatically diﬀerent than the ones
using a log-linear speciﬁcation, even though they are stronger in terms of not ﬁnding market
power. The estimated θ is even smaller and in most of the cases statistically not diﬀerent
from zero, which means that prices in the copper industry during the period 1950-1978 were,
on average, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than the ones predicted by a competitive model of the
industry.
Finally, in light of the empirical results, I would like to revisit the existence of rationing
in the U.S. copper industry during this period. There are two main attempts in the literature
trying to explain why copper producers might have rationed consumers. McNicol (op. cit.)
identiﬁes two circumstances in which rationing may be proﬁtable for a copper producer. First,
he shows that rationing may be a proﬁtable response to a large, unanticipated increase in de-
mand if there is long-run substitution in demand. Second, he shows that a partially integrated
copper producer may ﬁnd rationing proﬁtable as means of partially achieving the eﬀects of
price discrimination. Following this latter argument, Lal (op. cit.) shows that if price dis-
crimination is illegal, a monopolist maximizing long-run proﬁts may not satisfy the demand of
all consumers if consumers can be distinguished on the basis of stationary and non-stationary
33The results are shown in the appendix.
26demand curves.34 However, all these explanations are built on the assumption that copper
producers had market power, assumption that is somewhat contradictory with the empirical
ﬁndings of this paper.
The empirical results then, leave an open question: why would producers in an industry that
charges prices close to marginal costs decide to ration consumers? There are three potential
explanations. The ﬁrst and simplest one is that rationing actually did not occur. There is
mainly anecdotal evidence about the actual occurrence of rationing and the investigations of
the Congress and the Department of Commerce were not conclusive on this regard, so this is a
possibility that cannot be ruled out. A second one is related to the existence of some speculative
bubbles in many commodity markets during the early 70s. These bubbles were motivated by
fears of running out of natural resources and producers reacted trying to keep prices down
because high prices could reduced future demand dramatically. A third explanation can be
provided using a limit pricing model with capacity constraints. Slade (1991) shows that in
a two-stage game where ﬁrst-period prices aﬀect demand in the second period, producers set
low prices to discourage demand substitution (and/or entry) and ration consumers in periods
of unexpected high demand. One of the interesting aspects of this model is that the strategic
pricing (to avoid entry and/or demand substitution) and non-price rationing behavior is not
eﬀective without the joint action of the ﬁrms. Vives (1986) shows that in a market with
concave downward sloping demand and symmetric ﬁrms which compete in prices with constant
34He considers two groups of consumers, one facing capital adjustment costs and one not. Consumers incurring
capital adjustment costs have a demand for copper that is non-stationary (shost-run and long-run demand
elasticities diﬀer) and, therefore, copper producers can inﬂuence the investment decisions of these consumers
through their choice of the copper price.
27marginal costs and capacity limits, the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium converge
to the unique competitive price provided that the unsatisﬁed demand is allocated according to
what he calls "the surplus maximizing rationing rule" (eﬃcient rationing).35 Which of these
three explanations better explains the U.S. copper industry is an empirical question that is
beyond the scope of this paper.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Before 1978, most of the U.S. domestic copper production and an important fraction of
the imports of reﬁned copper were traded at a price known as the U.S. producer price, which
was set by the major U.S. producers. At the same time, the rest of the world was trading
copper at prices determined in auction markets like the London Metal Exchange (LME). It is
a fact that this two-price system existed until 1978 and an important eﬀort in the literature,
has been devoted to show that the U.S. copper industry enjoyed monopoly power before 1978
and explain why that was the case. Less work has been done trying to test if that monopoly
power was actually exercised or not and up to what extent. This paper tests empirically the
competitive behavior of the US copper industry. The U.S. copper industry can be characterized
as an industry with few sellers, important sunk costs, inelastic demand, and stable technologies.
Consequently, and given all the anecdotal evidence, this is a type of industry in which one would
expect to ﬁnd evidence of market power. Surprisingly, the results are consistent with prices
close to the ones predicted by a competitive model of the industry. However, it is important to
35Allen and Hellwig (1984) had previously shown that if proportional rationing is used instead, Nash equilibria
still converge to a competitive price, but monopoly prices persist in some ﬁrms.
28consider that these results must be interpreted only as the average market conduct during the
period 1950-78. It is still possible that the industry had exercised some market power during
very short intervals of time within this period and used a strategy of limit pricing to keep
prices down on periods of high demand in order to discourage new entrants.
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32Appendix
Table 5: Demand with Linear Speciﬁcation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Copper Price -157.4484 -143.3011 -320.8634 -276.8073
(72.8684) (61.8425) (68.3383) (63.9805)
Aluminum Price 270.3848 192.8622 319.5924 230.1697
(172.4344) (127.5689) (195.4523) (138.7923)
Ind. Indust. Prod. 3446.511 3317.381 3756.553 3389.336
(465.8608) (393.7257) (428.6542) (378.9182)
Fuel Oil Price -65.7127 -90.8249 -105.0055 -89.8765
(25.668) (19.2726) (21.2096) (20.6976)
Quarter 1 11857.42 9355.38 13536.45 10448.22
(2971.372) (2716.925) (2929.107) (2689.302)
Quarter 2 11477.60 10007.0 13257.84 10363.9
(3392.364) (2781.557) (3069.796) (2721.633)
Quarter 3 -7150.559 -7751.658 -5775.73 -6575.824
(2951.885) (2551.138) (2819.162) (2535.176)
Time -490.7238 -394.011 -552.6691 -419.3821
(91.1417) (70.4039) (82.2448) (71.1551)
Korea 5247.249 5439.522
(4847) (5240.334)
Constant 77611.75 36674.31 90793.73 57065.58
(25907.43) (24448.24) (21843.34) (23443.37)
¯ R2 0.3232 0.3425 0.4096 0.4230
N 417 513 349 424
F 21.38 25.95 24.98 28.37
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
33Table 6: Supply Correspondence with Linear Speciﬁcation
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Real Wage 2.9152 4.0736 2.9177 4.0252
(1.6481) (1.7115) (1.7272) (1.8198)
Price of Silver -0.0083 -0.0090 -0.0073 -0.0086
(0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0022)
Price of Fuel Oil 0.0671 0.1043
(0.0615) (0.0579)
Price of Electricity 0.5346 0.7075
(0.1465) (0.1702)
Price of Energy 0.4449 0.5014
(0.1603) (0.1277)
Strike80 0.5906 1.0912 0.2047 0.7712
(2.9660) (2.9484) (3.2405) (3.0738)
Strike6768 0.1966 0.9990
(2.9247) (2.9122)
Strike59 0.4078 0.7604 0.3676 0.7065
(2.9373) (2.9287) (3.1898) (3.0406)
Time -0.0373 -0.0229 -0.0286 -0.0227
(0.0429) (0.020) (0.028) (0.013)
Constant 167.179 158.763 165.464 162.099
(23.150) (20.7236) (23.459) (19.968)
θ 0.0023 0.0035 0.0091 0.0072
(0.0022) (0.0038) (0.0057) (0.0043)
¯ R2 0.3504 0.2779 0.4827 0.4475
N 429 525 361 436
F 17.01 14.98 26.67 28.21
Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors.
34